Maxine D. Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1954
Maxine D. Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Company : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Lewis J. Wallace; M. Blaine Peterson; Wallace, Adams & Peterson; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., No. 8251 (Utah Supreme Court, 1954).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2287
Case No. 8251 
... ,.. ............... ,.,,~ 
IN THE ·R'-,r.C'rvt:EJ u;:~_; 
. . c. . .J •. :: '-
SUPREME COUR.lY s 1955 
OF THE STATE-OF UTAH ~~ 
MAXINE D. LINDSAY, 
vs. 
ECCLES HOTEL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, doing business under the trade name 
and style of Hotel Ben Lomond, 
Appellant, 
Respondent. 
Appellant's Brief 
LEWIS J. WALLACE 
M. BLAINE PETERSON 
of 
WALLACE, ADAMS & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS____________________________________________ 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS__________________________________________ 6 
ARGUMENT _ _ _ _ ____ _ __ ______ _ _ __ _ _ ___________ ____ _ ____ _ _ _________ __________ 7 
Point 1. ERROR OF THE COURT IN GRANT-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE DISCHARGE OF THE JURY________ 7 
Point 2. THAT THE GRANTING OF DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION WAS CONTRARY TO 
LAW ------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
Point 3. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO AD-
MIT IN EVIDENCE THE SWORN AF-
FIDAVIT OF LILLIAN McGAHY, "EX-
HIBIT ONE" OF THE DEPOSITION 
OF LILLIAN McGAHY, AND IN 
STRIKING PARTS OF THE DEPOSI-
TION FROM THE EVIDENCE______________ 9 
Point 4. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO 
GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND SET ASIDE DE-
FENDANT'S "MOTION FOR JUDG-
MENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
DISCHARGE OF THE JURY"; AND TO 
IMPANEL A NEW JURY AND SET 
CASE FOR TRIAL; OR, IN THE AL-
TERNATIVE, MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL __________________________________ -------------------- __ 10 
Point 5. ERRORS IN LAW______________________________________ 7 
CONCLUSION ----------------------------- __ ------------------- ___ _ ________ 12 
Authorities Cited: 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., et al, 
____________________ u. ____________________ , 232 P. <2) 21 o________ 7 
W. T. Grant Co. vs. Karren 
190 F. < 2) 71 Q _______ --------------------------------------------------- 8 
Statutes Cited: 
Rule 59 < 4) -------------------------------------------------------- I 0, II 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Case No. 8251 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MAXINE D. LINDSAY, 
vs. 
ECCLES HOTEL COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, doing business under the trade name 
and style of Hotel Ben Lomond, 
Appellant, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 22, 1948, Appellant was a patron in the 
Coffee Shop of the Respondent Hotel Company (Appel-
lant's Deposition 3, 4; Deposition of Lillian McGahy 4). 
The floor of the shop was of tile construction, which was 
slippery when wet <Tr. 12, 17, 18). The weather was dry 
outside (Dep. Lillian McGahy 6) and the floor was dry 
when Appellant came in and was seated (Dep. Lillian 
McGahy 5, 10). 
The table at which Appellant and her companion 
were seated was near the rear or east end of the Coffee 
Shop on the south side, near the door to the kitchen 
(Appellant's Dep. 4, 5, 6; Dep. Lillian McGahy 4 and Af-
fidavit attached) and near the station where waitresses 
filled glasses and pitchers with water and ice (Affidavit 
attached to Dep. of Lillian -McGahy). 
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A long counter was at the front of the Shop <Ap-
pellant's Dep. 5) on the south side, and waitresses attend-
ing patrons at the counter and at other tables walked up 
and down the aisle past Appellant's table (Appellant's 
Dep. I3) with servings of food and water <Appellant's 
Dep. I3, I4). 
Between the time Appellant was seated and the time 
she left her table water had been spilled on the floor <Dep. 
Lillian McGahy 4, 5, 9) about a foot from the chair on 
which she had been seated <Dep. Lillian McGahy 6). It 
was the dinner hour, the waitresses were rushed, and the 
Hostess Lillian McGahy was helping the waitresses <Dep. 
Lillian McGahy 8, I 0, II>. 
On leaving her table, after finishing her refreshment, 
she started to walk toward the cashier to pay her check 
<Appellant's Dep. IO). As she did so, she slipped on some 
water on the floor <Dep. Lillian McGahy 4, 5, IO) of the 
aisle (Appellant's Dep. 10), between two rows of tables 
<Appellant's Dep. 10) somewhat north and west of where 
she had- been sitting (Appellant's Dep. 10), her white 
shoe (Appellant's Dep~ 3, 4) making a white mark (Ap-
pellant's Dep. 10; Dep. Lillian McGahy 4, 9) about six 
inches long (Appellant's Dep. 11; Dep. Lillian McGahy 
10), and where her heel had been in and had slipped 
through the water <Dep. Lillian McGahy 4, 9) and sus-
tained the injuries complained of. 
Appellant's amended complaint alleged negligence 
on the part of the Respondent: ( 1) In placing water or 
other slippery substance on the floor, or in causing the 
same to be on the floor, and in allowing or permitting it 
to remain thereon in such condition as to cause it to be 
dangerous to persons walking over and upon it <Para-
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graph 4 (a), Tr. 002); (2) In failing to give plaintiff and 
other persons any signal or warning of the slippery or 
dangerous condition of the floor at the time <Paragraph 
4 (b), Tr. 002); (3) In failing, after Respondent knew or 
should have known of the dangerous condition of the 
floor when wet, to remove the water or other substance 
therefrom or to take such other necessary action to remove 
or obivate the dangerous condition of the floor when \vet, 
by covering the floor with rubber mats or by the use of 
other means (See Amendment to Amended Complaint, 
Tr. 008). 
Respondent in its answer denied liability generally 
and specifically, and alleged that if there were any water 
or substance spilled on the floor it had no knowledge of 
such fact prior to the time Appellant claimed to have 
slipped thereon, and alleged contributory negligence (Tr. 
003). 
After a number of stipulated continuances the case 
was set for trial on April 14, 1954, and counsel for both 
parties were informed by the Court that no further con-
tinuances would be granted under any circumstances and 
that the case would be tried or dismissed on that date. The 
case was tried before the jury and submitted. 
Appellant was unable to attend the trial because of 
her physical condition and her deposition was ordered 
published and admitted in evidence <Tr. 004). The dep-
osition of one witness, Lillian McGahy, a resident of the 
State of California, was also published and admitted in 
evidence after portions of it had been ordered corrected 
or deleted ( Tr. 009) . The following portions of her dep-
osition were ruled inadmissable or changed by the trial 
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court; and counsel for Appellant and Respondent have 
stipulated that these are the portions so ruled upon: 
Page 4, line 24, changed from "her" to "a". 
Page 5, lines 11 and 12 deleted. 
Page 6, lines 24 to 32, inclusive, deleted. 
Page 7, lines 1 to 6, inclusive, deleted. 
Affidavit attached to the Deposition (referred to 
as plaintiff's Exhibit One) deleted. 
The jury was unable to reach a decision and was 
discharged <Tr. 007). At the conclusion of Appellant's 
case Respondent made a motion for a directed verdict 
which was overruled. At the conclusion of Respondent's 
case the Respondent's motion was renewed and ruling 
reserved by the Court <Tr. 006). On or about the 22nd 
day of April, 1954, Respondent served a "Motion for Judg-
ment Notwithstanding the Discharge of the Jury" upon 
Appellant which motion was thereafter argued and sub-
mitted. On May 7, 1954, the Respondent's Motion was 
granted by the Court <Tr. 010). 
Subsequent to the accident Appellant's mind became 
affected somewhat and in her deposition (Tr. 004) she 
testified that the name of her companion on the date of 
the accident was a Mrs. Davidson (Appellant's Dep. 3, 9, 
15, 16) whom her attorneys could not find. At the time 
of the trial, Appellant's health was such that her doctor 
would not permit her to testify, so that the case was tried 
as to her testimony on her deposition. Two days before 
the trial her attorneys discovered that the companion she 
had called "Mrs. Davidson" in her deposition was in fact 
a Mrs. Everetsen who, as it turned out, was at that time 
residing in Salt Lake City but was too ill to attend Court 
and testify. 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside 
Respondent's "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Discharge of the Jury"; and to Impanel a New Jury and 
Set Case for Trial; or, in the alternative, Motion for New 
Trial (Tr. 011). In support of her motion, Appellant ob-
tained and filed with the trial Court an Affidavit from the 
person identified as "Mrs. Everetsen" <Eleanor McFar-
lane Everetsen) previously called "Mrs. Davidson" by the 
Appellant. The Affidavit is dated May 14, 1954, shortly 
after the trial of the case, and was attached to and made 
a part of Appellant's Motion to Reconsider, and Appel-
lant's alternative Motion for a New Trial. In that Affi-
davit, offered to the trial court as newly discovered evi-
dence, the proposed witness said under oath: 
"* * * that she is acquainted with Maxine D. 
Lindsay, plaintiff above-named; that she was with 
the said Maxine D. Lindsay on the 22nd day of 
June, 1948, in the Hotel Ben Lomond Coffee Shop 
when the said Maxine D. Lindsay slipped and fell 
to the floor; that she, affiant, saw a waitress spill 
water on the floor in the aisle near the table at 
which they sat; that neither said waitress nor any-
one else wiped it up; that it did not occur to her 
at the time to invite the attention of the said 
Maxine D. Lindsay to the spilled water; that later 
when she and the said Maxine D. Lindsay started 
to leave said Coffee Shop she, affiant, saw the said 
Maxine D. Lindsay slip on the wet floor and fall 
to the floor; that she saw water still remaining on 
the floor after she helped the said Maxine D. Lind-
say up from the floor; 
"That when the said Maxine D. Lindsay fell to 
the floor she fell very heavily; that her feet seemed 
to fly out from under her; and that she fell in-
stantly and abruptly to the floor. 
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"That affiant was ill and unable to attend court 
at the time of the trial of said cause, although re-
quested so to do by one of plaintiff's attorneys on 
each of the two days immediately prior to the trial 
of said cause on April 14th, 1954." 
Notwithstanding that Affidavit and the basic facts therein 
set forth, pertinent to the real issue of the case, the trial 
court on July 20, 1954 (Tr. 012) denied Appellant's mo-
tion to reconsider and denied Appellant's alternative mo-
tion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. ERROR OF THE COURT IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE DISCHARGE 
OF THE JURY. 
2. THAT THE GRANTING OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION WAS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
3. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ADMIT IN 
EVIDENCE THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF 
LILLIAN McGAHY, "EXHIBIT ONE" OF 
THE DEPOSITION OF LILLIAN McGAHY, 
AND IN STRIKING PARTS OF THE DEPOSI-
TION FROM THE EVIDENCE . 
. 4. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND SET ASIDE DEFENDANT'S "MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
DISCHARGE OF THE JURY"; AND TO IM-
. PANEL A NEW JURY AND SET CASE FOR 
TRIAL; OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MO-
TION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
5. ERRORS IN LAW. 
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ARGUMENT 
So that the Court will be able to grasp readily the 
issues on this appeal, Appellant states the theory of her 
case, before discussing the several points which support 
that theory. 
It is Appellant's theory of the case, divided into two 
parts: 
A. That it was negligence for Respondent to fail to 
place rubber or other mats -on its floor to protect patrons 
from falling, when it knew or should have known its floor 
was slippery when wet and knew or should have known 
that water or other substances were frequently or oc-
casionally spilled thereon. 
B. That the Respondent was negligent in spilling 
water on the floor and not wiping it up, when Respondent 
knew or should have known that its floor was slippery 
when wet. 
Appellant will address the same argument generally 
to 
Point 1. ERROR OF THE COURT IN GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDG-
MENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE DIS-
CHARGE OF THE JURY. 
Point 2. THAT THE GRANTING OF DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION WAS CONTRARY TO 
LAW. 
and 
Point 5. ERRORS IN LAW. 
We think this case comes squarely within the deci-
sion of this Court in: 
Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., et al, 
--- U. , 232 P. (2) 210. 
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See also W. T. Grant Co. vs. Karren, 
190 F. (2) 710. 
In applying the law of the Walgreen case, consider 
the facts in this one: The floor was of ceramic tile 
which was slippery when wet. Appellant was a pa-
tron seated at a table at the rear of the Coffee Shop 
near the kitchen door where waitresses filled glasses 
and pitchers of water. When she was seated there 
was no water on the floor. Between that time and 
the time she rose to leave water had been spilled 
on the floor about a foot from the chair on which she had 
been seated. On leaving her place at the table Appellant 
slipped and fell to the floor. There was a visible mark 
on the floor where a heel had been in, slipped through 
the water. It was not raining outside and had not been 
raining that day. In her deposition the Hostess Lillian 
McGahy was asked how long the water had been on the 
floor. She answered: "Evidently just at that time a girl 
passed through perhaps had spilled some. I can't remem-
ber." <Dep. Lillian McGahy 5). The answer was stricken 
by the trial court; erroneously, we contend. There was no 
other source for the water. It was the dinner hour, the 
waitresses were rushed, and the Hostess Lillian McGahy 
was helping the waitresses. No one saw the quantity of 
water before the fall, but the testimony of the Hostess 
Lillian McGahy was that she saw water on the floor when 
she came back from the kitchen as she was coming 
through the kitchen door at the same time she saw Appel-
lant sitting on the floor (Dep. Lillian McGahy 9). She 
did not remember observing whether or not Appellant's 
dress was wet (Dep. Lillian McGahy 9) so that the quan-
tity of water then observed was what was left after Appel-
lant's heel had passed through it and after she had fallen 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the floor on or near the water, and after an undefined 
portion of it had evidently been displaced or absorbed by 
Appellant's clothing in the fall. There· still remained 
visible "about three tablespoonfuls" of water (Dep. Lillian 
McGahy 10). That amount of water on a hard-surfaced 
floor is a considerable quantity. 
In addition, we can now prove positively, by the 
proposed witness Mrs. Everetsen, that a waitress did spill 
the water, and thereby remove the last vestige of doubt, 
if any there ever were, as to the source of the water and 
the responsibility of the Respondent for its being there 
and for its remaining there. In view of this additional 
evidence, if not before, Appellant should have her day in 
court and have a jury pass upon her cause. 
Certainly, under this state of facts the question was 
one for the jury, as held in the Walgreen Drug Co. case, 
supra, and should have been re-submitted by the trial 
court after the first jury disagreed. 
Point 3. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ADMIT IN 
EVIDENCE THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF 
LILLIAN McGAHY, "EXHIBIT ONE" OF 
THE DEPOSITION OF LILLIAN McGAHY, 
AND IN STRIKING PARTS OF THE DEP-
OSITION FROM THE EVIDENCE. 
The affidavit of Lillian McGahy relating to the ac-
cident was obtained on or about the 18th day of February, 
1949. Thereafter she disappeared from the scene and was 
ultimately located in California. She had become a hostile 
witness. She not only refused to return to Utah to testify 
but refused to appear for the purposes of taking her dep-
osition until compelled to do so. 
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A comparison of the affidavit and the deposition 
shows many variances as to facts. It is our contention that 
the jury should have had both of them in their delibera-
tions. The affidavit, it will be observed, clearly shows the 
practice of the waitresses, and the source of the water. 
That affidavit was made when the facts were fresh in the 
memory of the affiant. It is true that Appellant's asso-
ciate counsel in California did not pursue this comparison 
for impeachment purposes as far as he should have but 
we submit that he made the affidavit a part of the deposi-
tion for that purpose. Respondent's attorney in California 
could have availed himself of unlimited examination on 
both the affidavit and the deposition. 
We have made an extensive search in an attempt to 
find cases on a similar situation, but have been unable 
to find any. We are compelled to submit this point based 
upon this brief statement. 
Point 4. REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND SET ASIDE DEFENDANT'S "MO-
TION FOR JU D G M EN T NOTWITH-
STANDING THE DISCHARGE OF THE 
JURY"; AND TO IMPANEL A NEW JURY 
AND SET CASE FOR TRIAL; OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial was based pri-
marily upon the supporting Affidavit of one Eleanor Mc-
Farlane Everetsen and should have been granted. It is 
admitted that it is discretionary with the trial court as to 
whether a new trial shall be granted and that his ruling 
will be upset only for an abuse of discretion. The require-
ment of the statute is as follows: <Rule 59 (4) ) 
JO 
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"Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced 
at the trial." 
A reading of the affidavit will show that the evidence 
therein contained was not cumulative nor of the same 
general nature as the evidence adduced at the trial. The 
evidence as to ho'v the water got on the floor is material, 
primary and direct, particularly in view of the Court's 
subsequent granting of Respondent's motion after having 
allowed the case to go to the jury. 
The only question on this point is whether Appellant 
used reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence and 
producing it at the trial. 
Again, we call attention to the fact that the identity 
of the witness was not known to Appellant's attorneys un-
til two days before the trial. It must be borne in mind 
that Appellant's mind had become affected as a result of 
the accident and she could not be held to a strict account-
ability for her conduct or memory. Counsel spent time 
and effort in trying to locate a "Mrs. Davidson'' but 
naturally were unsuccessful. When the true name of the 
witness was made known to Appellant's attorneys they 
undertook to find her and finally located her in Salt Lake 
City. By that time the jury had been called, the trial date 
definitely fixed, and the trial about to begin. Counsel 
talked to her husband by telephone during each of two 
days immediately preceding the trial and were informed 
by her husband that she was ill in bed and could not pos-
sibly appear. 
The Court had previously emphatically stated that 
there would be no more continuances of the case and that 
11 
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it would either be tried or dismissed on that date so that 
counsel did not feel justified in requesting another con-
tinuance and thereby incurring the ill will of the Court, 
particularly when counsel did not know whether the testi-
mony of Mrs. Everetsen would be material or merely 
cumulative. Moreover, to have made a motion for a fur-
ther continuance would have been a.:futile thing, and such 
a motion would have been denied by the trial court. He 
had expressed definite impatience in stating that no more 
continuances would be granted; and would not have called 
off the jury at that late date. Of this, counsel for Appel-
lant was then, and are now convinced. 
It is difficult for Appellant to ascertain what more 
could have been done to satisfy the requirement of due 
diligence than was done under ·the particular facts and 
circumstances of this case. ·Hindsight might now suggest 
a different course of action; but under stress of trial, Ap-
pellant's counsel used their best judgment. That judg-
ment might have been erroneous, but certainly there was 
no lack of due diligence. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Appellant submits that the trial court 
erred in not· submitting this cause again to a jury; and 
submit that Appellant's motion for new trial should have 
been granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LE-WIS J. WALLACE 
M.· BLAINE PETERSON 
of 
WALLACE, ADAMS & PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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